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ABSTRACT 
 
We analyze the effects of corporate governance reforms on interlocking directorship (ID), and we assess the 
relationship between interlocking directorships and company performance for the main Italian firms listed on 
the Italian stock exchange over 1998-2007. We use a unique dataset that includes corporate governance 
variables related to the board size, interlocking directorships and variables related to companies’ 
performances. The network analysis showed only some effectiveness of these reforms in slightly dispersing 
the web of companies. Using a diff-in-diff approach, we then find in the period considered a slight reduction 
in the returns of those companies where interlocking directorships were used the most, which confirms our 
assumption on the perverse effect of ID on company performance in a context prone to shareholder 
expropriation such as the Italian one.   
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1. Introduction 
The Italian corporate governance system features – at shareholder level - large ownership 
concentration and the presence of control-enhancing mechanisms in such a way which is conducive 
to controlling shareholders’ dominance at the expenses of minority shareholders (Barker, 2010). In 
1998 a structural reform of corporate governance was implemented in order to open up the market 
for corporate control and to protect minorities (the Draghi Law). At director level, the Italian 
corporate governance system is characterized by the widespread recourse to interlocking 
directorships (thereafter ID). In this respect, self-regulation provisions during the period 1998-2007 
attempted to reduce interlocking directorships.  
The purpose of this paper is to assess the effect of interlocking directorships on company 
performance (measured by ROE and ROA), and to understand whether the regulatory reforms had 
any influence on interlocking directorship. Using the instruments of network analysis, we find that 
after these regulations the concentration of the Italian network of companies decreased only 
slightly. In particular, the reforms implemented during this period were only partially effective in 
reducing the pathological cases of interlocking directorships: the companies at the center of the 
director network managed to reduce their peripheral links while keeping their strategic connections. 
Moreover, applying an econometric technique (diff-in-diff) that allows to treat reforms as a “natural 
experiment”, we find that,  coherently  with the our assumptions about the purpose of ID in the 
Italian stock market of expropriating shareholders, the resilience of a core network of highly 
interconnected listed companies did not allow such companies to increase their performance. 
Indeed, in the period considered there was a small significant negative effect on the performance of 
those companies that relied the most on ID.   
This work calls for strengthening the reforms enacted in the 1998-2007 period with further 
regulation on ID, which actually took place with new law provision in 2011: article 36 of the “Save 
Italy” Act ruled out interlocking directorships within the same industry, effective from 2012. 
Further studies will have to tell if the last wave of reforms finally managed to break the perverse 
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incentives of ID on company performance in Italy. With respect to other works, this is the first 
study that implements a quasi-experimental technique – which provides causal evidence - to address 
the impact of this kind of corporate governance reform. This evidence is complemented by a 
network analysis that, although it cannot provide causal claims, helps to measure and visualize the 
dispersion of the linkages among interconnected companies.     
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the characteristics and the legal changes 
in the Italian corporate governance system, whereas Section 3 discusses the literature on 
interlocking directorships and company performance and derives the hypotheses to test. Section 4 
presents the methodology and data. Results are discussed in Section 5, and robustness checks are 
provided in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. The Italian corporate governance system: history and reforms 
In Italy corporate control is exerted by “industrial families” through alliances based on cross 
participations, yielding stability in control, in a context in which pyramidal groups have been  
exploited as a way to separate ownership from control, using capital provided by third parties in 
order to fund growth. This allows controlling families not only to keep control over the group but 
also to control the majority of shares in all companies belonging to the pyramid with direct 
ownership concentrated at the highest level of the control chain, minimizing the amount of capital 
invested in order to control the whole group. Italian listed companies also issued shares with limited 
or without voting rights in order to increase capital without diluting the control of the parent 
company (Zattoni, 1999; Melis, 2000).
1
 Furthermore, when additional capital was required, control 
has been maintained by forming coalitions with other groups (Amadori and Brioschi, 1997; Barca, 
                                                   
1 Cross-ownership of up to 2% for listed companies and up to 10% for non-listed firms is permitted. Special shares with 
right to vote only in extraordinary meetings are allowed up to 50% of capital.  
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1997; Gianfrate, 2007).
2
 This is a long-standing feature of the Italian corporate system: Rinaldi and 
Vasta (2005) document the widespread recourse to director interlocks and to cross-shareholdings 
for the post-World War II period, Vasta and Baccini (1997) and Drago et al. (2013) provide 
evidence for the period before World War II, with an emphasis on the bank-industry relationships. 
Di Pietra et al. (2008) analyze the effect of interlocking directorships on share prices in a 
panel of 71 non-financial Italian companies from 1993 through 2000 and find a limited positive 
effect.  Dick and Zingales (2004) emphasize that in Italy private benefits of control are higher than 
in France, Germany and the UK, due to lower investor protection, poorer accounting rules, lower 
tax compliance and a less independent press. In Italy, expropriatory high private benefits of control 
affected the preference of controlling families in keeping control as a tool to guarantee these 
benefits over time. In order to limit these abnormal benefits of control, corporate governance reform 
should increase minorities’ rights and their enforcement. If this does not happen, ownership does 
not open up, and firms do not grow. 
Two main legislative reforms have characterized the Italian corporate governance system: the 
Draghi Law
3
 (Consolidated Law on Finance, TUF) in 1998 and the Vietti law reform of 2002-4,
4
 
with some marginal addition by the Law on Savings in 2005.
5
  
The Draghi Law was born out of the consolidation of financial market laws into a single act in 
order to “amend the laws on listed corporations with specific regard to the board of internal 
auditors, minority shareholder rights, shareholder voting agreements and intra-group transactions, 
with a view to strengthen the protection of savings and minority shareholders.” (Article 21, Para. 4, 
                                                   
2 However, Faccio and Lang (2002) documented that out of 208 listed firms 12.98 were widely-held, 59.61 family-held, 
10.34 state-held and 0.72 held by cross-ownership, therefore emphasizing the role of families and putting aside the role 
of coalitions. 
3 Legislative Decree No. 58/1998. 
4
 Legislative Decrees Nos. 61/2002, 6/2003, and 37/2004. 
5 For overviews of these reforms see Ferrarini (2005), Melis (2006) and Enriques (2009). 
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Law 52/1996). The Law streamlined the legal framework for securities offerings, takeover bids, 
disclosure obligations, and audit firms. Minority shareholders representing a minimum threshold 
(ranging from 1 percent to 10 percent of the outstanding shares) were granted governance rights and 
remedies previously either unavailable (two-thirds majority required in extraordinary meetings and 
shareholder representing 5 percent of company’s capital may sue directors derivatively) or subject 
to higher ownership thresholds (shareholders representing 10 percent of company’s capital may 
request that a meeting be convened and shareholders representing 5 percent of company’s capital 
may file a complaint to the Court asking for the appointment of an inspector). Disclosure on 
ownership structure was extended by requiring full disclosure of all shareholder agreements. A 
“mini-breakthrough” rule was introduced, declaring shareholder agreements by which parties 
restrict their own freedom to sell shares ineffective in the event of a takeover bid. The lift of a ban 
on proxies came together with heavy regulation of proxy solicitation and a provision allowing mail 
voting on an opt-in basis. As to audit functions, the Law completely reshaped the role, composition, 
and powers of the board of internal auditors: representation of minority shareholders was mandated, 
its powers and the powers of individual members strengthened, and its mission clarified by focusing 
on internal controls. A restyling of the legal regime of audit firms was implemented, by clarifying 
their tasks. Finally, Consob’s statutory objectives in supervising issuers were spelt out (investor 
protection, efficiency and transparency of the market for corporate control and of capital markets), 
its regulatory authority broadened and its powers to request information, execute on-site inspections 
and impose ad hoc disclosure duties extended. 
The Draghi Law had both signaling and concrete effects. For the former, it improved the 
perception of Italian capital markets abroad, at a time of increasing competition for capital.
6
 
Therefore it signaled the new stance on corporate governance that policymakers mostly followed in 
subsequent reforms. A number of idiosyncrasies characterizing the Italian regulatory framework 
                                                   
6 Shleifer and Vishny (1997) stated that “[i]n many countries today, the law protects investors better than it does in 
Russia, Korea, or Italy”). 
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were abandoned in favor of regulations similar to international standards. For instance, the internal 
board of auditors was retained as a separate body within the company, but its functions were 
streamlined to replicate those of audit committees in the US and the UK. The takeovers regime was 
reshaped drawing inspiration from the UK model: first, a complete ban on defensive tactics was 
replaced by a rule requiring a shareholder meeting authorization to adopt them; second, a 
mandatory bid rule triggered by the crossing of a 30 percent threshold replaced a mandatory partial 
bid rule triggered by the acquisition of control. Rules on shareholder agreements, a traditional tool 
for control in which dominant families and financial institutions have built blocks and cross-
holdings in the major Italian listed companies, were weakened by imposing a maximum duration of 
three years and by introducing a “mini-breakthrough rule” allowing parties of shareholder 
agreements to freely tender their shares in a takeover by declaring any restriction on share sales in 
the shareholder agreement ineffective in the event of a takeover bid.  
The Draghi Law emphasizes the autonomy of each firm in choosing its corporate governance 
model. The result was the adoption of the first version of the Italian Corporate Governance Code in 
1999
7
 (the so-called Preda Code), as a set of self-regulatory best practices to be adopted 
spontaneously by the Italian listed companies to satisfy company’s organizing needs and investors’ 
goals.
8
 The basic principle of the Code is “comply or explain”, i.e., the company may not comply 
with the prescriptions of the code if it fits better with its needs, but noncompliance should be clearly 
explained.  
Among other things, the Code emphasizes the role of the Board of Directors in determining 
and implementing the strategic objectives of the company, the autonomy of its non-executive 
members and the presence of a sizable number of independent directors. Non-executive directors, 
with their competences obtained outside the firm, should give a critical assessment of the proposals 
of the executives in order to align their decisions with the interest of shareholders. Independent 
                                                   
7
 Bianchi et al. (2011) find that in “related party transactions” the adoption is more formal than substantial. 
8
 Law No. 262/2005 and Legislative Decree No. 303/2006. 
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directors should play an important role in board committees. The Code recommends establishing 
remuneration and internal audit committees, and suggests the setting up of an appointment 
committee. The Preda Code advises the separation of the roles of the Chief Executive Officer and 
the Chairman of the Board, but highlights a number of cases in which lack of separation may be 
accepted because of specific organization needs. In the latter case, the role of the independent and 
non-executive directors is then the key to protect minority shareholders.  
The first version of the Preda Code claimed that “Directors accept the appointment when they 
believe that they can carefully attend their duties by devoting the necessary effort in terms of time” 
(art. 1.3), then the 2002 update added to the previous sentence that “[directors accept the 
appointment] also taking into account the number of directorships they hold either in other listed 
companies (also abroad) in financial, banking and insurance companies or in large non-listed 
companies”. A further addition stated that “each year the board of directors surveys and gives 
public information of the directorships held in listed and non-listed companies by their members”.9  
Since 2001 Assonime, the Association of the Italian Joint Stock companies, publishes a report 
to track the compliance of listed companies with the Preda Code. The first compliance with the 
Code was not very effective: companies compiled their reports in a quite mechanical way without 
disclosing significant information (Assonime, 2001: 3-4). However, disclosure improved sharply 
since the second report (Assonime, 2003: 4).   
While according to Enriques (2009) the long period of reforms has produced some 
improvements in the degree of investor protection, the author also observes that a more radical 
improvement would only be possible after the enactment of mandatory disclosure and fairness 
regulation of related-party transactions, which has taken place only on December 1
st
 2010. Bianco 
and Bianchi (2008) provide evidence on the actual evolution of corporate governance following the 
                                                   
9 In the 2006 version a further paragraph was added stating that each board decides how many concurrent directorships 
a director can hold at the same time that are compatible with the effort required, also discriminating between executive, 
non-executive and independent members of the board.    
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legal changes started in the late ‘90s. They find that while at the beginning of the ‘90s, pyramids, 
dual class shares and cross-ownership were widely used, in 2007 their importance was substantially 
reduced with an increase in another control mechanism: the coalitions among shareholders. 
Moreover, they observe a lower value of the proxies for control premium, a greater compliance with 
corporate governance codes, and an increased presence of institutional investors at annual 
shareholders’ meetings.  
 
3. Interlocking directorship networks and performance  
ID has been pointed out as the “root of many evils” by Brandeis (1914). Probably because 
Brandeis was one of President Wilson’s counselors, in 1914 the Clayton act prohibited ID among 
competitors. According to the principle that “no man can serve two masters”, IDs were seen as a 
tool to decrease competition, therefore damaging the market. In the second part of the 20
th
 century, 
ID have been studied and made the object of several contributions, both theoretical and empirical. 
 
3.1 Interlocking Directorate: Theoretical Framework 
Various theories have been advanced to explain the presence of ID on company boards. We 
classify those theories according to two main streams: the first one sees ID as a relation between 
institutions; the second one focuses on the relationship among individuals. Divided in these two 
categories, theoretical contributions can be grouped into seven theories or models: three referring to 
ID as a link between individuals, and four referring to ID as a link between institutions. 
Management Control Model. This is the first model that considers ID as a link among 
individuals. The model stresses the power of managers in pursuing strategies that are not in line 
with shareholders’ interests. Managers tend to appoint as directors managers from other companies 
so that they are busy and passive, and do not contradict those who called them in their role. Palmer 
(1983) investigates what happens when a link between two firms disappears due to the death or 
retirement of a director. Only a minority of these links are created again after they disappear: if 
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these links were functional to connect two institutions they would be promptly reconstituted. 
Ornstein (1984) reports similar results from a Canadian context. According to Koening et al. 
(1979), managers use ID to increase their power: interlocked directors are often passive and never 
vote against managers that “hired” them. 
Hallock (1997) studies the effect of cross interlocks between CEOs on their compensation. His 
findings show an increase in CEO salary of about 17% due to the presence of interlocks. Fitch and 
White (2005) discover a negative relation between the number of interlocks and CEO turnover. This 
work reaches conclusions closely related to those suggested by Cochran et al. (1985), who finds a 
positive relation between interlocks and the quality of the “golden parachute” for top managers. 
Renneboog and Zhao (2011) find that stronger networks allow higher CEO compensation because 
of information sharing and managerial influence.  
Class Hegemony Model. Mills (1956) and Useem (1984) describe ID as the result of a strong 
social cohesion. Directors contact other directors following a relationship pattern: for example, they 
go to the same golf or country club, they share the same beliefs and values, and they often have  
shared political views. In other words, they all belong to the same business elite.  
Mizruchi (1992) reports how firms linked by ID are more likely to support the same political 
view. Keoning et al. (1979) studied the 1972 Nixon Presidential Campaign and observed that those 
companies belonging to the same network were more likely to contribute to the Nixon Campaign if 
one of such corporations had contributed before. Etzion and Davis (2008) found that the Bush 
administration recruited more heavily from corporate officers and directors than the Clinton 
administration. Moreover, both administrations served as springboards for subsequent corporate 
board appointments. In particular, all but one of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ended up serving on the 
board of a military contractor after government service. 
Career Advancement Model. Stockman et al. (1988), Zajac (1988) and Perry and Peyer (2005) 
propose a theory focused on the interest of each single interlocked director. In this model, directors 
decide to interlock following mainly four drivers: compensation, prestige, future networking and 
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job opportunities. Directors decide to interlock simply following their individual interest. 
Institutions, governance or the social context are not relevant. 
Resource Dependence Model. The first model that sees ID as an instrument to connect 
institutions was proposed by Selnick (1947), and was then followed and supported by many other 
contributors [e.g., Dooley (1969), Pennings (1980), Palmer et al. (1986), Mizruchi and Stearns 
(1988), Lang and Lockhart (1990) and Cross and Cumming (2004)]. According to this model, 
companies face enormous uncertainty in their business life. Uncertainty may be about customers, 
suppliers, competitors, macroeconomic conditions or other features. This model sees ID as a tool to 
reduce uncertainty. That is why a part of ID brings vertical/horizontal integration or is between 
institutions belonging to the same industry (Dooley, 1969). The resources firms are looking for 
when they interlock are also intangible, such as information, business practice or prestige. Maggio 
and Powell (1983) suggest that a bank is more likely to lend money if the borrower has directors 
with high prestige and reputation. Geletkanycz and Boyd (2011) find that CEO with outside 
directorships are beneficial in contexts of low growth, low concentration and less diversified firms. 
Appointing CEOs or directors that are already central in the network is a signal for corporate 
governance quality to financial markets, reducing perceived uncertainty (Davis and Robbins, 2005;  
Westphal and Zajac, 1998). 
Financial Control Model. Capital is one of the most important resources a company needs to 
run its business. That is why a specific model explains ID as a tool to have easier access to capital. 
There is high empirical evidence of ID among banks and industrial companies. Dooley (1969), 
Mizruchi (1998) and Mizruchi and Stearns (1988) found more ID with banks in those companies 
with an increasing demand for capital. Moreover, often banks have a central role in networks (Davis 
and Mizruchi, 1999).  
Having a banker on the board of an industrial company board reduces information asymmetries 
between the bank and the industrial company. Companies may benefit in raising more debt capital; 
in addition, the banker ensures better monitoring during debt life. When this relation follows or 
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precedes a lending relationship then conflicts of interests arise. The banker faces a conflict: sitting 
on the board of the industrial company should maximize shareholders’ values; at the same time she 
should maximize bank debt value. A simple way to maximize bank debt value is to reduce company 
leverage. But reducing company leverage is a benefit for shareholders only if the current leverage 
ratio is above the optimal level (Modigliani and Miller, 1963). On the other hand, as explained 
before having a banker on the board may give industrial companies the opportunity to raise more 
debt. Empirical evidence on the topic is mixed (Byrd and Mizruchi, 2005; Rommens et al., 2008). 
Dittmann et al. (2010) find that in Germany bankers on the board of non-financial firms promote 
their banks as lenders and advisors, and help them with funding in difficult times. 
The Collusion Model. According to the collusion theory, ID allows the creation of 
communication channels between companies to make agreements against consumers. Interlocking 
directorships can be an instrument to cartelize a market because sharing directors allows cartel 
participants to have an observer in place monitoring activities that could undermine the cartel 
agreement. A system based on direct IDs may thus potentially produce economic inefficiencies. 
Pennings (1980) finds a positive association between industry concentration and horizontal ties, 
while Burt (1983) finds an inverted U-shaped function: in the case of very high market 
concentration, few producers have little need to interlock to set prices. 
Drago et al. (2011) have observed that the features of ID in the Italian stock market do not 
correspond to any of the previous hypotheses, formulating the Enlarged Collusion Model. 
Differently from the Management Control, Class Hegemony, and Career Advancement models, ID 
take place in companies that are characterized by concentrated ownership. In contrast with the 
Resource Dependence and the Collusion models, ID occur in companies that do not necessarily 
belong to the same business sector. Differently from the Financial Control Model, ID take place 
also in companies that are not creditors and debtors. According to the authors, ownership 
concentration, cross-shareholdings, and ID might be functional to the expropriation of minority 
shareholders. 
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3.2 Interlocking Directorates and Company Performance 
The seven models presented reach different conclusions about the effects of interlocking 
directorships on company value.  
The Resource Dependence Model suggests a positive effect on company performance: the 
ability to control or at least reduce uncertainty give an advantage. The same conclusions can be 
drawn from the Financial Control Model: the opportunity to gain easier access to capital markets 
produces an important advantage for any company. On the other hand, the Management Control 
Model and the Enlarged Collusion Model suggest a negative effect on company performance. The 
assumption supporting the first theory is that managers hire interlocked directors in order to have a 
higher degree of freedom and thus move away from their fiduciary duties towards shareholders, 
while under the Enlarged Collusion Model the choice of ID is made by controlling shareholders 
with the purpose to have passive company boards with respect to shareholder expropriation. 
The Class Hegemony Model could support positive or negative effects of ID on company 
performance. According to this theory, directors are not chosen for their competences or skills; 
therefore they should produce a disadvantage for the company. On the other hand, being part of a 
business elite could generate new contracts, opportunities and other advantages. The Career 
Advancement Model supposes a positive effect of ID on company performance. If directors are 
chosen for their ability and their skills they will bring beneficial effects. The Collusion Model 
suggests a positive effect of ID on company performance because of higher margins due to lower 
competition, whereas for the Enlarged Collusion Model the effect is negative through expropriation 
of minority shareholders.  
Table 1 summarizes the expected effects of ID Models on company performance, which are 
mostly positive.   
                                                 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
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 While with a Dutch sample, Franses and Non (2007) find a slightly negative effect of a new ID 
on company performance with a time lag after the link is created, Rommens et al. (2008) find the 
opposite using a different Dutch sample. Yeo et al. (2003) find a positive relation between the 
number of links and profitability (ROA). The same conclusion is drawn by Brantleys and Flingstein 
(1992) with a US sample. Studying samples from different contexts, with different legal or cultural 
environments, can therefore easily mean studying different ID models. 
By considering our discussion of the reforms implemented in Italy in the last fifteen years 
(namely the Draghi Law and the amendment of the Preda Code aimed at reducing the number 
interlocking directorships) and our literature review, we can test the following hypotheses: 
 
H1: The reforms have dispersed the board interlocking network.  
H2: Reforms have a neutral or negative effect on the returns of the most interlocked companies. 
 
H1 aims to verify whether the limitation to ID introduced in the Preda code had any effects, 
starting from the anecdotal evidence that has been previously discussed (mainly Enriques, 2009). In 
particular, we provide quantitative evidence based on the network analysis methodology. In this 
part of the analysis we will only consider the “center” of the network, that is the main listed 
companies which account for the bulk of the “relational capitalism” of the Italian families. 
Moreover, this also reduces the computational problems related with a large network of about 200 
companies per year. 
H2 is based on the Enlarged Collusion Model which we find appropriate to the Italian 
specificities described above in Section 2. As long as the reforms did not manage to eliminate a 
network of highly connected companies, no visible positive effect is to be expected on the 
profitability of such companies.  
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4. Methodology and data 
We use an original dataset, obtained from two different sources. We gathered information about 
all the boards of directors for all the companies listed on the Italian stock exchange of Milan from 
the Italian security and exchange commission (Consob). We collected market and balance sheet 
data for these companies in the same period (source: Datastream). We consider a ten year period 
from 1998 to 2007, although the two dataset do not completely overlap. 
As for the first part of the dataset, the sample used in the work is related to the listed non-
financial companies in Italy from 1998 to 2007, where we refer to board composition as of 31 
December of each year. The number of companies belonging to the panel changes over time: 134 in 
1998, 147 in 1999, 179 in 2000, 194 in 2001 and 2002, 191 in 2003, 188 in 2004, 201 in 205 221 in 
2006, and 239 in 2007. For each listed company we collected the data of board composition from 
Consob datasets, ordered by company, name and surname. Starting from this matrix, we obtain 
another matrix in which we consider all directors by the number of directorships in each company 
(this is called 2-way matrix). Using the Cross-Product Algorithm (Bonnacich, 1972) we transform 
matrices in 2-way company X directors in 1-way matrices in which we have both in row and 
columns the same subject: directors X directors, and companies X companies. From these two 
matrices we run the network analysis for directors and companies, and as a result we obtained some 
measures of centrality that we consider together with other network features.
10
 As for the second 
part of our dataset, it contains performance measures of the Italian listed companies for seven years 
(2001-2007). The final merged database consists of two distinct groups of variables: (i) corporate 
governance variables related to board size and interlocking directorships and (ii) another group of 
variables related to companies’ economic and financial performances. We do not impute the 
missing values in this dataset. The relevant underlying assumption we consider for the problem of 
missing data here is that missing data are “missing at random”, so we do not consider missed 
observations. At the same time, data do not show structural phenomena of non-response (so the 
                                                   
10 Further details are given in Appendix I.  
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missing value we assume is “at random”) for the part of the database related to interlocking 
directorships. Table 2 provides summary statistics.
11
  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
In particular, we collect the number of directors with more than 1, 2, … directorships to 
build one variables related with ID: the Number of interlocking directors with more than 5 
directorships. We divide this variable by the board size to obtain the Share of interlocking directors 
with more than 5 directorships, which we believe is a better measure of busyness since it consider 
the influence of these directors on board size. These variables are similar to those used by Fich and 
Shivdasani (2006). This variable is called Dense in the estimation.    
The dependent variables are ROE and ROA,
12
 alternatively. Among independent variables, 
we also consider Financial Leverage: 
tsts
ts
ts
MKCTL
TL
LM
,,
,
,

     (1) 
where MKC is Market Capitalization and TL stands for total liabilities. The statistical methodology 
followed in this work is divided into two distinct parts: in the first part, we study the network 
structure by obtaining some indices of centrality and density. From the social network analysis, we 
obtain some important insights into the network dynamics over time. Then, we test the hypothesis 
about network stability over time and the impact of the reforms (H1). In particular, some tests of 
equality of medians are used to observe that variables related to the number of directors with 3 
directorships and more tend to be different year by year (and so they are directly impacted by the 
considered reforms).  
                                                   
11 The correlation matrix is available upon request from the authors. 
12 Another candidate would be Tobin’s q, but we had very few data in order to estimate meaningful econometric 
relationships. 
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The second part of the econometric procedure uses a diff-in-diff (DD) methodology in order 
to evaluate the impact of the reform (in particular H2). The estimated model using longitudinal data 
is: 
 
tststs DenseAfterDenseAfterR ,,ts,43210,    YX     (2) 
 
where Rs,t is either ROE or ROA, After = 1 after 2004 and zero otherwise, Dense = 1 if there are 
directors with more than 5 ID and zero otherwise,
13
 the vector Xs,t includes some control variables 
such as financial variables (the log of Total assets, Sales-per-share, and Financial leverage), and 
corporate governance variables such as Board size, Ys,t are the year-dummies, and εs,t is an error 
term.  
Diff-in-diff is a technique which attempts to mimic an experimental research design using 
observational study data, called “natural experiment”.14 It calculates the effect of a treatment (i.e., 
an explanatory variable or an independent variable) on an outcome (i.e., a response variable or 
dependent variable) by comparing the average change over time in the outcome variable for the 
treatment group to the average change over time for the control group. In our framework, the 
                                                   
13 We experimented with lower numbers of directorships to construct the dummy, but they were never significant. 
Results are available upon request form the authors. 
14
 A natural experiment is an empirical study in which individuals (or clusters of individuals), exposed to the 
experimental and control conditions, are determined by nature or by other factors outside the control of the 
investigators. Thus, natural experiments are observational studies and are not controlled in the traditional sense of a 
randomized experiment. Natural experiments are most useful when there has been a clearly defined exposure involving 
a well-defined subpopulation (and the absence of exposure in a similar subpopulation) such that changes in outcomes 
may be plausibly attributed to the exposure. In this sense the difference between a natural experiment and a non-
experimental observational study is that the former includes a comparison of conditions that pave the way for causal 
inference, while the latter does not. 
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treatment is the reform, and we are interested in checking whether returns are affected by the reform 
from 2004 onwards, and whether the companies that relied the most on ID were affected the most. 
 
5. Results and discussion 
5.1 Social Network Analysis 
The Social Network Analysis is conducted on the interlocking directorship network.
15
 In this 
part of the analysis we only consider the Italian Blue Chip companies, identified according to the 
MIB 30 Index until 2002 and the S&P-MIB 40 Index, introduced in 2003. In this way, we consider 
the most capitalized companies of the entire network.  
Table 3 shows the centralization and density values for the network, together with their relevant 
index numbers.
16
 Centralization measures the deviation of a network to the "star" network, in which 
one single node is connected to all the other nodes and they are not connected together. Density 
describes the general level of linkage among the points in a graph. It is calculated as the ratio 
between the number of ties and its total possible number (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). A tie is a 
link between two companies established by sharing one or more directors . The higher the density 
of a network of companies or directors, the higher the number of links among the companies or 
directors. Over the nine years considered, the Italian Blue Chips network density decreased of about 
50%, which means that in 2007 the system is less interconnected and the network of interlocking 
directors less dense than in 1998. At the same time, centrality increases, showing that the centre of 
the system increases its relevance. Appendix 2 shows the networks in selected years of our time-
span. 
                                                   
15 Chiesi (1985) pioneered the use of social network analysis in the study of Italian capitalism. He found that in the ‘70s 
two poles co-existed, based respectively on state and on privately owned companies. Some companies, such as Bastogi 
and Sme, were the bridges between them, since in their boards of directors sat many members of the two poles.   
16 See Appendix 1 for the relevant formulae. 
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 The decrease in density seems related with the lower number of multiple directorships due to 
the revision of the Preda Code and with the undertaken reforms. The two opposite variations in 
centralization and density are linked: as reforms reduce the number of interlocking directorships, 
the ones who are abandoned are those relatively less important, connecting members of the network 
periphery and not the periphery with the centre. Hence centralization increases creating a more 
hierarchical structure. In the end, the Italian Blue Chips reacted to the changes in the regulatory 
framework by moving from a model which allowed a high degree of communication among all the 
Blue Chips to a model which ensures communication through a few key companies (and directors). 
Such adaptation allowed the Italian Blue Chips to maintain the features of the Italian key listed 
companies as a network of companies whose decisions are known to each other, and therefore 
allowing for shareholder expropriation. 
We can test H1 in a more formal way. Table 4 shows the equality of medians for the number 
of directors with more than 1 to 5 directorships. The null hypothesis is the equality between the 
medians over time whereas the alternative is the difference. The values in the table represent the 
number of values greater than the median. The null hypothesis of equality of the medians from 1998 
to 2007 cannot be rejected for the number of directors with 1 and 2 interlocking directorships, 
whereas it can be rejected for higher number of directorships. The result is consistent with the 
previous observation that the network tends to reduce the number of links over time, but this 
reduction is mainly concentrated on directors with more than 3 directorships.  
These results can be interpreted as the impact of reforms over the time, in particular the 
amendments to the self-regulatory Preda Code that started addressing the issue of ID in 2002 and 
therefore required some time to be implemented by companies. We observe a differentiated impact 
of the reforms: they seem not to strictly affect the network structure but to reduce the number of the 
highest number of linkages. In this respect, we note that the reduction in the number of multiple 
directorships takes place in 2004-2007, and that since 1998 the Italian regulatory framework 
gradually emphasizes the need for directors to limit the number of directorships.  
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Network stability is only partially consistent with Corrado and Zollo (2006), who studied the 
interplay between privatizations and corporate governance reforms in Italy, finding evidence of 
destructuration at the macro level of the network, with substantial stability at lower levels of the 
analysis.
17
 These results, however, are not specific to Italy: Davis et al. (2003) find a remarkable 
network stability of American directors between 1982 and 2001, a period with strong changes in the 
ranking of firms, in the positions held by individual directors, and in corporate governance 
practices. 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
5.2 Diff-in-diff 
To test the significance of the H2 hypothesis we estimate a diff-in-diff model to ascertain the 
effect of the reform on ROE and ROA. In Table 5 for ROE the variable Post is insignificant, 
showing the absence of an effect of the reform on all companies. However, Dense and After×Dense 
are both significant: the first is positive, showing that companies that have a high share of 
interlocking directors benefit from this feature, the second is negative claiming that the reform had 
effect on this companies and that their profitability was affected. We need to note that the size of 
this coefficient is relatively small. These results are consistent across specifications. Looking at the 
other variables, we find that Total assets and Sales-per-share are significantly positive, and Board 
size is significantly negative, differently from Di Pietra et al. (2008) where it was not significantly 
different from zero. The only not statistically significant variable is Financial leverage.   
As far as the treatment effects are concerned, results for ROA (Table 6) are very much in 
line with those of ROE. However, Sales-per-share and Board size are significant but change their 
signs, and Financial leverage turns out to be significantly negative. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
                                                   
17 We should note that their results are based on a different definition of network: ownership in their approach, and IDs 
in ours. 
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[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
6. Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to assess the relationship between interlocking 
directorships and company performance for the main companies listed on the Italian stock market in 
the period 1998-2007. Second, to analyze the Italian network of interlocking directorships to verify 
its structural features over a time period that has been characterized by a changing regulatory 
framework. 
In the period considered a legislative act – the Draghi Act Law - was introduced in Italy to 
limit shareholder expropriation. Besides, in the successive versions of the Italian corporate 
governance code (a self-regulation tool) there was an increasing emphasis on the need to limit the 
number of ID. We find that in the period considered there was only a limited reduction in the 
concentration of the Italian network of companies. In particular, the reforms implemented during 
this period were only partially effective in reducing the pathological cases of interlocking 
directorships: the companies at the center of the director network managed to reduce their 
peripheral links while keeping their strategic connections. The efficiency in reducing the number of 
links while keeping the relevance of the main nodes was already shown by Drago et al. (2007). The 
econometric analysis confirms our original assumption on the negative effects of ID on company 
performance in the Italian stock market: the companies that over the period considered continued to 
rely heavily on ID showed a slight decrease in their performance (measured by ROE and ROA). 
The overall result is consistent with our original model whereby in the Italian stock market ID 
seems to be instrumental to shareholder expropriation.  
Our conclusion is that the reforms implemented in Italy during the 1998-2007 period were 
only partially effective in the short term. Further studies will have to investigate whether such 
reforms have been more effective in the medium term, together with more recent reforms on related 
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party transactions enacted in 2010 (Consob 2010) and the new limitations to ID introduced in 2011. 
Data for such studies will be available in the coming years to allow for a robust empirical analysis.   
We recognize some limitations of this study. Firstly, the results are idiosyncratic to Italy, a 
country whose listed companies are characterized by a concentrated shareholder base and the 
recourse to control-enhancing mechanisms in such a way which is conducive to controlling 
shareholders’ dominance at the expenses of minority shareholders. Secondly, there is a latent 
variable that we cannot observe, the actual participation to board meetings: we expect busy 
directors to participate less, but we have no evidence for this behavior. Thirdly, and perhaps most 
importantly, further empirical research should also include the interplay between cross-
shareholdings and ID. 
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TABLE 1 - Summary of the models 
Model Effect on firm performance 
Management Control Negative 
Class Hegemony Mixed 
Career Advancement Positive 
Resource Dependence Positive 
Financial Control Positive 
Collusion model Positive  
Enlarged Collusion Model Negative 
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TABLE 2 – Summary statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total assets 13.016 1.821 7.474 18.507 
Sales-per-share 12.525 68.033 0.003 953.205 
Board size 8.990 3.251 2 21 
Financial leverage 0.521 0.236 0.009 0.994 
Dense 0.653      0.476           0 1 
Post 0.0222     0.147           0 1 
Summary statistics for the sample of the listed non-financial companies in Italy, where we refer to board composition as 
of 31st December of each year. The number of companies belonging to the panel changes over time: 134 in 1998, 147 in 
1999, 179 in 2000, 194 in 2001 and 2002, 191 in 2003, 188 in 2004, 201 in 205 221 in 2006, and 239 in 2007. 
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TABLE 3 – Centralization and density of the network 
Year Centralization 1998=100 Density 1998=100 
1998 7.34 100 0.031 100 
1999 7.72 105 0.030 98 
2000 6.07 83 0.032 103 
2001 8.19 112 0.031 99 
2002 8.42 115 0.032 103 
2003 6.29 86 0.033 108 
2004 7.26 99 0.033 108 
2005 9.20 125 0.027 89 
2006 9.52 130 0.024 77 
2007 9.34 127 0.021 68 
Network measures computed on the sample of 30 blue-chips listed in the Italian Stock Market (MIB 30 Index until 2002 
and the S&P-MIB 40 Index). 
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TABLE 4 - Equality tests for the medians 
Greater than 
the median 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
Number of directors with one directorship        
No 78 93 110 129 118 108 103 114 137 156 1,146 
Yes 56 54 69 65 76 83 85 87 84 83 742 
Pearson χ2(9) = 11.2522  p = 0.259         
      
Number of directors with two directorships      
No 69 86 114 113 115 127 124 116 140 142 1,146 
Yes 65 61 65 81 79 64 64 85 81 97 742 
Pearson χ2(9) = 12.8150  p = 0.171         
       
Number of directors with three directorships       
No 94 112 134 149 162 129 137 142 155 175 1,389 
Yes 40 35 45 45 32 62 51 59 66 64 499 
Pearson χ2(9) = 18.2287  p = 0.033             
       
Number of directors with four directorships       
No 117 122 162 154 161 162 150 163 181 181 1,580 
Yes 17 25 17 40 33 29 38 38 40 40 308 
Pearson χ2(9) = 15.8715  p = 0.070        
       
Number of directors with five directorships       
No 116 133 154 181 173 177 164 162 197 234 1,691 
Yes 18 14 25 13 21 14 24 39 24 5 197 
Pearson χ2(9) = 44.9377  p = 0.000         
The median in each year is zero. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 28 
 
 
 
TABLE 5 – The effect of reforms on ROE   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Total assets 
 
0.1219   
(0.091)     
0.1068***   
(0.0813)     
0.1261***   
(0.0815)     
0.1375***   
(0.0848)     
Sales-per-share 
 
0.1869***   
(0.0189)      
0.1928***   
(0.0018)     
 0.1832***   
(0.0021)     
Board size 
 
-0.1694***    
(0.0468)     
  -0.1765***    
(0.0539)     
Financial leverage 
 
-0.9547   
(0.8333)     
0.7919   
(0.8351)     
0.5547   
(0.8503)      
     
After 0.2122    
(0.6051)      
0.1600   
(0.6057)      
-0.1713   
(0.6245)     
0.1600   
(0.6057)      
Dense 0.1774***   
(0.0122)     
0.1716***   
(0.0121)     
0.1634***   
(0.0124)     
0.1734***   
(0.0114)     
After×Dense -0.3974***   
(0.0160)     
-0.1033***    
(0.0160)     
-0.1052***    
(0.0165)     
-0.1384***    
(0.0161)     
Constant -1.3600***   
(0.1154) 
-1.3117***   
(0.1151)    
-1.6138***   
(0.1146)    
-1.4183***   
(0.1258)    
Observations 1645 1645 1645 1645 
R
2 
0.3304 0.3250 0.2758 0.3484 
Year-dummies are not shown.  p-values are indicated by stars (* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001). The 
results are corrected for heteroscedasticity.   
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TABLE 6 – The effect of reforms on ROA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Total assets 0.0152***   
(0.0019)      
0.0173***   
(0.0017)     
0.0163***   
(0.0016)      
0.0152***   
(0.0019)      
Sales-per-share -0.00009**   
(0.00004)     
-0.00010**   
(0.00004)     
 -0.00009**   
(0.00004)     
Board size 0.00232**   
(0.00099)      
  0.00232**   
(0.00099)      
Financial leverage -0.1401***   
(0.0174)     
-0.1430***   
(0.0174)   
-0.1495***   
(0.0173)     
 
After 0.0052   
(0.0261)      
0.0134   
(0.0259)      
0.0174    
(0.0258)      
0.0052   
(0.0261)      
Dense -0.0392***   
(0.0128)     
-0.0359**   
(0.0127)     
-0.0357**   
(0.0127)     
-0.0392***   
(0.0128)     
After×Dense -0.0702**   
(0.0343) 
-0.0652*   
(0.0343)     
-0.0642*   
(0.0343)     
-0.0702**   
(0.0343) 
Constant -0.0347*   
(0.0241)     
-0.0413*   
(0.02406)     
-0.0263*   
(0.0233)     
-0.0347*   
(0.0241)     
Observations 1669 1669 1669 1669 
R
2 
0.0994 0.0970 0.0941 0.0984 
Year-dummies are not shown.  p-values are indicated by stars (* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001). The 
results are corrected for heteroscedasticity.   
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APPENDIX I – NETWORKS CALCULATIONS 
 
A network  G =(V, E) is a set V of vertices or nodes (q) that link a set E of edges or ties. Networks 
are usually represented by an adjacency matrix Bi j where Bi j = 1 if there is an edge, Bi j = 0 if not. If 
an edge connects every vertex V, a graph (or a network) G is complete. The set of the neighbors 
(nodes) of q is NG (q) and they are connected to q by an edge. To represent the network over time, 
initially we have a data matrix A1 referring to the entire database: 
 
   (
                     
                     
      
                     
)        (1) 
 
Where di,1 ={"director1", "directorn"}, i = 1,...,n; ci,2 ={"company1","companyn"}, i = 1,...,n; ai,3...k 
={"attribute1,3...k ","attributen,3...k "}, i = 1,...,n ; ti,z={year1, …, yeart}, i = 1998...2007. 
The statistical unit (represented by the row of the matrix 1) is the directorship. Each director d i,1 
may have n multiple directorships where the same directorship is characterized by k - 2 qualitative 
attributes a i, 3…k over time ti z. From (1) we obtain an affiliation matrix (company-director) A2 and 
then we partition it by year ti, obtaining nine affiliation matrices (A2,t=1998...2007) characterized by row 
by the same director i and in column by the company c. The term dirj, q represents the existence of a 
directorship. Every year ti the number of the companies (in columns) and directors (in row) change 
due to new listed companies, delisting, and so on. 
 
     (
                  
                  
    
                  
)         (2) 
Where: dir j= J w= W={0,1}, j =1...J , w =1...W; w= {company1,...,companyW}; j={director1,..., 
directorJ}; ti={year1, …, yearn},i = 1998...2007. 
 
The directorships (either for each year and globally) over the period considered by each director d j 
are obtained from the affiliation matrix A2,t=1998...2007 : 
 
     ∑ (∑      
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 (∑      
 
   )     
(∑      
 
   )       
(∑      
 
   )     
(3) 
        Similarly, from the affiliation matrix it is possible to obtain the number of directors by 
company during the period 1998-2006. 
 
The matrix (2) represents a two-mode network (we consider either the director j and the company w 
at time ti). Alternatively, we can build one more network matrix by year t, either for companies or 
for directors. In the case of companies we have them in the rows and in the columns and the 
general term of the square matrix ui,k  represents the number of directors in common between 
company i and company k. In this way we obtain the matrix (4): 
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)         (4) 
 
By recoding the matrix (existence of the relationship =1, nonexistence =0) we obtain the adjacency 
matrix  B4,t. In the same way we obtain the matrix for the network of the directors. We refer to a 
particular network at t 1998...2007 either for companies and for directors. We then transform the data 
matrix (4) in a longitudinal dataset of network data. In this way we are able to study the persistence 
of connections over the time. 
 
From the affiliation matrix (2) each director di,1 at the time t may sit on n different boards 
(represented in columns). As we know from (3) the directorships by year are obtained by the 
affiliation matrix: 
 
       (∑      
 
   )           (5) 
 
As components of the network, we define sets of nodes in which it is possible to reach other nodes. 
A Graph (or network) is defined as connected when there is only one component. In a connected 
Graph any pair of connected nodes of a network i is the set of companies in (4) characterized by: 
∑        
 
   then d(q) > 0. 
 
Density Et is computed by considering the ui,j elements of the adjacency matrix A3,t or B4,t 
divided by the number of nodes in a network t : 
 
   
(∑ ∑     
 
   
 
   )
      
     (6) 
 
If  Et = 1 there is perfect network connection.  
 
Centrality represents the most important indicator of relevance and power of a node q in the 
network. Each node (either the company or in a different context the director) is characterized 
by the Freeman Degree, FDt which is the sum of the links by node q: 
 
       ∑       
 
     (7) 
 
with j =1,…,W for the directors or j =1,...,J for the companies using the matrix (2). The Freeman 
Degree can be considered as a measure of local centrality. We measure centrality in a network by 
the actual value Freeman Degree compared with the maximum value it can achieve: 
 
    
∑          
 
   
   [∑            
 
   ]
  (8) 
 
Maximum centrality is reached in a star network, therefore this index measures the distance of the 
actual network to the star network. 
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APPENDIX 2 – Networks in selected years 
Interlocking Directorship Network, 1998. 
 
 
 
Interlocking Directorship Network, 2000. 
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Interlocking Directorship Network, 2002. 
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Interlocking Directorship Network, 2004. 
 
 
Interlocking Directorship Network, 2006. 
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